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THE PHYSICIAN'S CONSCIENCE,
CONSCIENCE CLAUSES, AND RELIGIOUS
BELIEF: A CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE
Edmund D. Pellegrino*
INTRODUCTION
Conscientious persons strive to preserve moral integrity. This
requires that their external behavior be congruent with their con-
science's internal dictates about what they take to be morally right
and feel compelled to do. In our morally diverse world, conscien-
tious persons may come into conflict with each other and with soci-
ety's moral values. Except for the amoral sociopath, conflicts of
conscience are a regular feature of the moral life. Even for ex-
treme relativists, resolving these conflicts is a constant challenge.
Any society purporting to serve the good of its members is there-
fore obliged to protect the exercise of conscience and conscientious
objection. However, this involves a serious dilemma for any plu-
ralist, democratic, liberal, or constitutional state. On the one hand,
such a society is committed to tolerance of religious diversity, free-
dom of individual choice, and "neutrality" with respect to religious
belief. On the other hand, optimizing freedom of conscience for
some individuals may often limit the legal rights, social entitle-
ments, and moral beliefs of others.
This dilemma is most acute for health professionals who hold
strong religious beliefs, some of which cannot be compromised in
good conscience. Can conscience clauses protect Catholic and
other religious health professionals' moral claims to freedom of the
exercise of their conscience? To what extent can these legal mea-
sures secure rights of conscience in the face of a liberal, demo-
cratic, and secular society' s commitments to moral relativism,
personal freedom of choice, and an implicit social contract with its
professionals? Is there some point at which religious believers are
morally compelled not simply to refrain from participation, but to
dissent in the public arena using the processes of a democratic soci-
* Professor Emeritus of Medicine and Medical Ethics at the Center for Clinical
Bioethics at Georgetown University Medical Center. The Author was the John Car-
roll Professor of Medicine and Medical Ethics, and the former director of the Ken-
nedy Institute of Ethics, the Center for the Advanced Study of Ethics at Georgetown
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ety to change public policy? This Essay engages some of these is-
sues in the specific case of Roman Catholic physicians whose
religious beliefs are becoming progressively counter-cultural on the
so-called "human life" issues.' Roman Catholic physicians serve as
paradigm cases for all whose religious beliefs compel them to re-
fuse to participate in certain acts, which are legal and even "re-
quired" in their societal roles.2 Although this Essay focuses on
physicians are the focus, the same issues confront nurses, social
workers, allied health workers, and all others who serve any func-
tion in our health care system. Similarly, although end-of-life is-
sues will be used to illustrate particular conflicts of conscience,
similar conflicts arise in other dimensions of modern health care,
such as contraception, abortion, various types of assisted reproduc-
tion, sterilization, stem cell research, and cloning. This Essay will
discuss only the ethical dimensions of the conflicts while others at
this conference with the requisite legal expertise will discuss the
legal aspects of conscience clauses.
Good law should be based on good ethics; in other words, the
rights and claims it protects should carry moral weight and justifi-
cation. Yet, in resolving conflicts of conscience in secular societies
the complexity of the legal issues reflects the complexity of the eth-
ical issues.3 Often they are extremely difficult to dissect. This is
significant because once the ethical issues are expressed in law, the
debate may be reduced to instrumental and procedural details that
cannot resolve underlying moral sources of controversy.
For this reason, much more debate is required before conscience
and exemption clauses can be applied in ethically defensible ways.
The existence of a statutory protection does not assure the exercise
of freedom of conscience. This Essay seeks to examine some of the
ethical desiderata behind conscience clauses in the case of Roman
Catholic physicians' conflicts of conscience. It does so under five
headings: first, why conscientious objection is so important in our
day; second, the moral grounding for freedom in the exercise of
conscience; third, the components of the physician's conscience;
1. U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE
FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN AND ON THE DIG-
NITY OF PROCREATION, DONUM VITAE (1987) [hereinafter DONUM VITAE]; John Paul
II, Evangelium Vitae, Encyclical Letter, 24 ORIGINS 690, 691-700 (1995) [hereinafter
Evangelium Vitae].
2. DONUM VITAE, supra note 1, at 14-20, 35-39.
3. Mark R. Wicclair, Conscientious Objection in Medicine, 14 BIOETHICS 205, 210
(2000).
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fourth, specific conflicts of conscience for Catholics physicians and
institutions; and fifth, competing models of conflict resolution.
I. WHY CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IS A PROBLEM
Convictions about the right and wrong conduct, both as a profes-
sional and as a person, form the physician's conscience. Conscien-
tious physicians have always had to protect each domain from the
demands of tyrants, law, custom, and professional colleagues.
Each era has had its own challenges to the physician's conscience.
In our own time, profound changes in both the physician-patient
relationship and society's construction of the ends of medicine, as
well as the secularization of American society, have conspired to
the physician's claim to freedom of conscience.
Most powerful perhaps is the shift in the locus of decision-mak-
ing from the physician to the patient or her surrogate. Beginning
in 1914, 4 extending through both the Karen Ann Quinlan cases 5
and related cases in the 1970s,6 and the accompanying trend to
micromanagement, the right to refuse care has rapidly
metamorphosized into a right to demand and dictate the details of
care. For some, the ends and goals of medicine are no longer de-
fined solely by physicians, but by social convention or the demands
of patients or their families.7 On this view, the physician practices
by virtue of a social contract, which grants her profession the privi-
leges of freedom to practice in return for provision of those ser-
vices that society requires or demands. What constitutes the
practice of medicine is societally determined. In Oregon for exam-
ple, assisting suicide is defined as a normal part of the physician
practice, whereas it is forbidden in other states.8
These trends are exacerbated by the de-professionalization of
medicine, which views health care 'as a commodity, and its delivery
4. See Schloendorf v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93-94 (N.Y. 1914) (stating
that a patient has the right to refuse treatment when doctors operate on a patient that
explicitly stated that they did not want the operation).
5. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671 (N.J. 1976) (installing father as guardian
of comatose daughter "with full power to make decisions with regard to the identity
of her treating physicians.").
6. See, e.g., Rizzo v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 356, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (grant-
ing patient a preliminary injunction preventing the Food and Drug Administration
from prohibiting the importation of a drug not approved for his personal use).
7. Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Goals of Medicine: How Are They To Be De-
fined?, in THE GOALS OF MEDICINE 55, 58-60 (Daniel Callahan & Mark J. Hanson
eds., 1999) [hereinafter Pellegrino, The Goals of Medicine].
8. Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 127.630, 127.635, 127.640 (1996), with ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-10-106 (2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (1999).
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a matter of corporate enterprise, profit, and commercialization.9 A
managed care organization now monitors and controls physicians'
decisions.10 Corporate policy circumscribes the physician's judg-
ments of conscience about the patients' welfare. Recent profes-
sional organizations are trying to recapture professional commit-
ment, but it may not be possible given the fact that most physicians
are now employees of corporate entities."
in such a society, such profoundly religious issues as the morality
of abortion, euthanasia, human cloning, and stem cell research are
determined on grounds of utility, general consensus, or freedom of
choice. In the secular philosophy, there is no other world beyond
the immediate utopianism of a man-made heaven on earth. This
vision determines secular society's decisions about what is permis-
sible and what is not.
All of this is occurring against the recent historical experience of
past and present totalitarian governments subverting the uses of
medical knowledge to political and economic purposes. We need
not recite again the way the Soviet Union distorted the Hippocratic
Oath to make it serve the purposes of Communism, 2 the Nazi phy-
sicians' acquiescence in using their knowledge in the service of ge-
nocide, 3 or the participation of physicians as instruments of
torture or terrorism by so many petty dictators and war lords. 4
The laws and social conventions of pathological societies justified
all these violations of the ethics of medicine.
Today's societal context poses serious conflicts of conscience for
all physicians, but especially for the religious physician. The teach-
ings.of the Roman Catholic Church on medical morals and human
life issues go back half a millennium. 15 Its present positions on
9. Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Commodification of Medical and Health Care: The
Moral Consequences of a Paradigm Shift from a Professional to a Market Ethic, 24 J.
MED. & PHIL. 243, 244-51 (1999) [hereinafter Pellegrino, Commodification].
10. Id. at 253.
11. Medical Professionalism in the New Millennium: A Physician Charter Project
of the ABIM Foundation, ACP-ASIM Foundation and European Federation of Inter-
nal Medicine, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 243, 244-46 (2002), available at http://
www.annals.org/issues/v136n3/toc.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
12. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Guarding the Integrity of Medical Ethics: Some Les-
sons from Soviet Russia, 273 J. AM. MED. Ass'N. 1622, 1622-23 (1995) [hereinafter
Pellegrino, Guarding the Integrity].
13. HENRY FRIEDLANDER, THE ORIGINS OF NAZI GENOCIDE: FROM EUTHANA-
SIA TO THE FINAL SOLUTION 216-45 (1995).
14. See generally MAXWELL G. BLOCHE, URUGUAY'S MILITARY PHYSICIANS:
COGS IN A SYSTEM OF STATE TERROR (1987).
15. DAVID F. KELLY, THE EMERGENCE OF ROMAN CATHOLIC ETHICS IN NORTH
AMERICA 25 (1979).
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many crucial issues are distinctly and unapologetically ethically
counter-cultural.16 Many Jewish, Protestant, and Moslem physi-
cians share some of the same beliefs and experience equivalent
challenges to their moral integrity. Clearly, for all religiously ori-
ented physicians the question must be addressed-is it possible to
maintain moral integrity and remain an active physician in a secu-
lar world? Secularists ask the same question, but with different
expectations about what would be a morally defensible response.
It was against the background of these changes in the climate of
American medicine and its practice that conscience clauses made
their appearance. In 1973, when the United States Supreme Court
removed the prohibition against abortion, a medical procedure was
legalized, which at that time and since, was morally repugnant to
many physicians and the public.1 7 In recognition of these objec-
tions, the United States Congress passed legislation that exempted
physicians and others from participation. 18 Most of the states19 and
other countries2° also enacted exemption legislation, which allowed
those who objected to abortion and a variety of other procedures
to refrain from participation.
Several decades later, individual states recognized patient's legal
right to execute advance directives through a living will or a dura-
ble power of attorney for health.2 1 The resulting statutes were de-
signed to guarantee a patient's right to direct the manner and
extent of end-of-life care when she had lost the capacity to make
her own decisions to accept or refuse treatment.
The Americans with Disabilities Act reaffirmed this right and
required hospitals to inquire on admission whether patients had
executed an advance directive.22 If they had, the hospital was
16. DONUM VITAE, supra note 1, at 12-13, 16-20, 23-25, 32-38; Evangelium Vitae,
supra note 1, at 691-700, 709-16; Pope Paul VI, Encyclical Letter of Pope Paul VI
Humanae Vitae: To Our Dearest Sons and Brothers Health and Apostolic Blessing, in
HUMANAE VITAE AND THE BISHOPS: THE ENCYCLICAL AND THE STATEMENTS OF
THE NATIONAL HIERARCHIES 33, 37-44 (John Horgan ed., 1972).
17. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (holding that abortion
is a fundamental right guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (1999).
19. Wicclair, supra note 3, at 207 (citing L.D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of
Health Care Providers, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 177, 177-230 (1993)).
20. M.L. DiPietro, Evoluzione Storica dell'istituto, dell'obiezione di coscienza, 6
ITALIA MEDICINA E MORALE 1093, 1093-1151 (2001).
21. E.g., ARK. COD. ANN. § 5-10-106(d) (Michie 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:2233 (West 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.4 (West 1997).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(e)(2) (2001); see also Cruzan v. Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1990) (inferring the necessity of inquiry into a
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bound to respect its requirements. 23 Similarly, in the case of abor-
tion, Congress recognized that some physicians would have moral
objections to participation, so they were exempt provided they
transferred care to another physician.24 In both cases, abortion and
advance directives, the moral claim to freedom of conscience was
given legal status in "conscience clauses."
II. MORAL FOUNDATION FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND
CONSCIENCE CLAUSES
Freedom of conscience, however, is a moral right .2  The first ax-
iom of a moral life is to do good and avoid evil. This remains true
whatever theory of right and wrong one may hold, whether one is a
moral absolutist or relativist, a deontologist or utilitarian, or a com-
munitarian or a social constructionist. Every moral system under-
takes to determine what is right and wrong, good and evil, and
desires that its worshippers act so that one may be done and the
other avoided. This remains true whatever substitute term moral-
ists may use for good and bad, and even if they deny their exis-
tence. "Values" is now the term in favor. Values are labeled
"good" or "bad," morally "wrong" or "right." Values are replacing
terms like principles, duties, and virtues; thereby, equating the nor-
mative with the subjective.
All humans, ethicists included, possess an inner conviction of
what is right and wrong and feel compelled to act in accord with
that judgment. That inner conviction is the result of an act of prac-
tical reason applied to the moral status of an act performed in the
past, or yet to be performed.26 In the Catholic tradition, con-
science is called "the law of our intellect" because it is a judgment
of reason deduced from natural law.27 In the Catholic tradition,
patient's desire to refuse treatment as the natural corollary of the duty to obtain
consent).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1)(D); see generally Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269-70 (discuss-
ing the right of a competent adult to leave express instructions declining consent to
life sustaining medical treatment).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 238n.
25. Rev. Donald W. Wuerl, The Bishop, Conscience and Moral Teaching, in CATH-
OLIC CONSCIENCE FOUNDATION AND FORMATION 123, 127-28 (Russell E. Smith ed.,
1991).
26. THOMAS AQUINAS, On Conscience. Disputed Questions on Truth 17, in
THOMAS AQUINAS SELECTED WRITINGs 217, 221-23 (Ralph Mcinery ed. & trans.,
1998) [hereinafter AQUINAS, On Conscience].
27. Id. at 224-26; THOMAS AQUINAS, I THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS question 79, at art. 13 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans.,
1920), available at http://www.newadvent.org/summa (last visited Sept. 29, 2002)
[hereinafter AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA].
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and in other moral traditions as well, the judgments of conscience
are morally binding, i.e., they must be followed or the moral agent
has acted immorally and accountably. 28 The act of conscience may
be in error about the facts, it may reason erroneously, and it may
misunderstand or misapply the moral precept it is using.29 How-
ever, when it is convinced that it has seized upon the right thing to
do, conscience impels the person to act in a certain way.30 To ig-
nore this "inner voice" is to induce guilt, remorse, and shame.
Only the amoral sociopath escapes the grip of conscience.
Errors of conscience occur when an individual misidentifies the
good.31 The person who follows a wrongful conscience may or may
not be morally culpable depending upon whether her ignorance of
the good is willful or culpable.32 Roman Catholics are bound to
follow the dictates of conscience, but they are also responsible for
the formation of a good conscience. 33 This requires serious educa-
tion and reflection on the content of official church teachings. 34
Nominal "Catholics," who firmly believe that fidelity to conscience
dictates opposition to church teachings on the issues of human life
and sexuality, are arguably examples of wrongly formed con-
science.35 Their "consciences" compel them to oppose official
(Magisterial) teaching, which, for Catholics, is a source of authori-
tative guidance for conscience formation. 36
To act against the dictate of conscience is to act against natural
law-that portion of divine law accessible to human reason. But,
for Catholics, conscience is also "said to be of divine insertion, in
the way in which all knowledge of the truth that is in us is said to
be from God, by whom the knowledge of first principles has been
placed in our nature. '37 Hence, for the Catholic, to then ignore,
repress, or act against conscience for any reason is a violation of
28. AQUINAS, On Conscience, supra note 26, at 228-33 (stating "[t]hat conscience
binds means that when one does not follow it he incurs sin.").
29. Id. at 226-28. Aquinas claims that conscience is a science that never errs, but
rather, any errors occur from the application of this science to "some special act." Id.
at 226.
30. Wuerl, supra note 25, at 127-28.
31. AQUINAS, On Conscience, supra note 26, at 226-27.
32. See id. at 234-36 (claiming that not following an erroneous conscience would
constitute a sin, but that actively pursuing this erroneous conscience is also a sin).
33. Rev. Benedict Ashley, Elements of a Catholic Conscience, in CATHOLIC CON-
SCIENCE FOUNDATION AND FORMATION, supra note 25, at 39, 48-52.
34. Id. at 50-52.
35. Frances Kissling, The Place for Individual Conscience, 27 J. MED. ETHICS ii24,
ii25-27 (2001).
36. Ashley, supra note 33, at 50-52.
37. AQUINAS, On Conscience, supra note 26, at 225.
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philosophical as well as theological ethics, an error in moral agency
and a sin against God.38 In an analogous way, similar gravity
would attach to violations of conscience in all moral systems, relig-
ious or secular. Though the idea of a "human nature" is in disfavor
today, the conclusion is inescapable, that there exists in all but the
most morally obtuse, an operative conscience, a sense of moral
compulsion to follow its dictates, and a perception of ethical dis-
quiet in not doing so.
In every belief system, fidelity to conscience is closely identified
with the preservation of personal moral integrity. To arrive at a
conclusion that something must be done or avoided, and to act ac-
cordingly, is to exhibit the kind of person one is, and wants to be.
That act provides evidence that the individual is the kind of person
she says she is. Not acting in accordance with this conclusion is to
incur the justifiable charge of hypocrisy. Often, to act against con-
science is to violate personal identity so directly as to lead to severe
psychosocial and emotional sequelae.
Therefore, conscience clauses are firmly rooted in what it is to be
a human person morally, intellectually, and psychologically. Every
individual, by virtue of being human, has a moral claim to the free
exercise of conscience. The practical question for positive law in
framing legal conscience clauses is how to protect this claim in
morally pluralistic societies. How can conscience clauses assure
the individual right to conscience while at the same time recogniz-
ing how widely the content of conscience can vary between and
among individuals in their personal, social, and professional roles?
Whose conscience is to prevail in the worlds of individual relations
and public policy?
This is a question that confronts all individuals in every walk of
life. It is of growing significance in the profession of medicine with
respect to doctor's professional and personal beliefs and prac-
tices.39 For Roman Catholics it is so crucial that Pope John Paul II
38. Id. at 228-33; see also Wuerl, supra note 25, at 127-28.
39. Thomas Faunce, Peri-Gravid Genetic Screening: The Spectre of Eugenics and
Medical Conscientious Non-Compliance, 6 J.L. & MED. 147, 152-55, 161-66 (1999);
Thomas May, Rights of Conscience in Healthcare, 27 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 111, 111-
21 (2001); Richard S. Myers, On Laws: On the Need for a Federal Conscience Clause, 1
NAT'L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 23, 23-25 (2001); Carl A. Osborne, How Can We Practice
Veterinary Medicine Conscientiously?, 215 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N. 1238,
1238-39 (1999); Jing-Bao Nie, Chinese' Conscientious Acceptance of the Birth Control
Policy, 13 MED. HUMAN. REV. 82, 82-85 (1999) (reviewing CECILIA NATHANSEN
MILWERTZ, ACCEPTING POPULATION CONTROL: URBAN CHINESE WOMEN AND THE
ONE-CHILD FAMILY POLICY (1997)).
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has called on physicians to be conscientious objectors with respect
to pro-abortion and pro-euthanasia legislation. 0
III. THE PHYSICIAN'S CONSCIENCE
Physicians, in the course of their work as healers, must form
their consciences in two inseparable dimensions of their lives-the
professional and the personal. Professional conscience concerns it-
self with two facets of the physician's daily work. First, the ethical
propriety of her conduct qua-physician with references to the
moral duties of the physician-patient relationship. Second, is the
moral obligation to practice "good" contemporary medicine, i.e.,
medicine that is scientifically competent and humane. Personal
conscience deals with the physician's own moral beliefs of a spiri-
tual, philosophical, cultural, and ethnic nature. Both professional
and personal conscience are owed protection.
A. Conscience in Physician-Patients' Relationships
One set of obligations relates to such matters as the construct
one puts on the physician-patient relationship, is it a contract, a
covenant, a commodity transaction, a service relationship-or a vo-
cation? How much respect for patient autonomy is obligatory?
Do the patients' "values" override the physician's beliefs? What is
a just allotment of scarce resources in a given case? How absolute
is the obligation to preserve confidences? Should physicians have
sexual relationships with patients? Is the patient's good primary,
or is society's? Is the physician-patient relationship simply
whatever is negotiable between them?
In the past, one might have assumed that a more or less general
consensus existed among physicians on these issues even though
there always were individual lapses in application. The Hippo-
cratic ethic was the moral lingua franca of physicians across history
and cultures.4 ' Today, consensus on the precepts of the Hippo-
cratic ethic has been seriously eroded. Individual physicians and
40. John Paul 1I, Doctors Protest Conscience Discrimination, The Holy Father's
Address to the International Congress of Catholic Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 48
DOLENTIUM HOMINUM 65, 65-66 (2001) [hereinafter John Paul II, Doctors Protest];
John Paul II, The Medical Doctor Should Respond as a Conscientious Objector to
Legislation in Favor of the Crimes of Abortion and Euthanasia, 15 DOLENTIUM
HOMINUM 133, 133-35 (2000) [hereinafter John Paul II, The Medical Doctor].
41. See generally Edmund D. Pellegrino, Bioethics at Century's Turn: Can Norma-
tive Ethics Be Retrieved?, 25 J. MED. & PHIL. 655, 655 (2000) (discussing the growth of
bioethics from traditional medical ethics) [hereinafter Pellegrino, Bioethics at Cen-
tury's Turn].
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their professional organizations now hold different positions on the
moral status of their relationship with patients.42 One cannot as-
sume any longer a common formation of professional conscience,
or a shared conception of ethical physician behavior. Physicians in
our day may act in accord with their consciences with drastically
different and even contradictory presuppositions about what is
morally permissible in their relations with patients.
B. Conscience in the Practice of Competent Medicine
A lesser, but nonetheless significant element in the physician's
conscience, is her perception of what constitutes "good" medicine.
This is a subtle combination of personal and professional morality.
Its focus is on medicine as a tekn6, an art based in skills and knowl-
edge of how to heal well.43 While there are skeptics who would
argue that we cannot define what "good" medicine is, there is the
fact that we all distinguish between doctors whose judgments and
skills we trust, and those we do not. There are also the inescapable
differences among physicians in terms of morbidity, mortality, and
diagnostic accuracy. Doctors may also differ, as a matter of con-
science, in their opinions about the worth of new and old proce-
dures, consultants they do and do not trust, the reliability of clinical
data, the use of alternative or complementary medicine, and the
role of other health team members. These can be matters of con-
science for the physician who wants to be a "good" clinician, sur-
geon, healer, or counselor; the better to serve the best interests of
the patient.
We will consider later whether or not this heuristic dissection of
professional and personal ethics is sustainable in actuality or in
light of conscience clauses.44 First, let us turn to a few illustrations
of the way these three sectors of the physician's conscience can
conflict in her relationship with patients and then with the de-
mands of our secular democratic societies.
42. See, e.g., Mich. v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 311-12 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001)
(demonstrating the spectrum of physicians' interpretations of the Hippocratic Oath's
medical ethics according to their conscience).
43. Teknj is an ancient greek term that characterizes actions and professions as an
art or craft rather than just a normal action. OXFORD CONCISE ENGLISH DiCTIONARY
1471 (10th ed. 1999) (origin of the word techno-).
44. See infra Part VII.
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C. Conscience in Personal Moral Beliefs
In addition to her perception of professional ethics, each physi-
cian brings to her relationship with the patient a personal set of
moral beliefs. She bases these moral beliefs in religious affiliation,
personal preference, or moral reflection. Here we confront such
crucial issues as the licitness of abortion, euthanasia, assisted
suicide, in vitro fertilization, and stem cell research-the whole
Pandora's box of "human life" issues, emerging from our unprece-
dented control of every phase of human life.
These issues center on how we value human life itself, its pur-
poses, quality, destiny, and utility. Conflicts of belief in this realm
are more profound and deeply felt in one's conscience than other
issues of professional behavior with patients. For religious individ-
uals of many persuasions, these issues bear directly on their per-
sonal spiritual destinies and are, therefore, least subject to
compromise.
In the last fifty years, secularism has come to dominate much of
medical ethics, despite the fact that most Americans personally
hold religious beliefs.45 Secularism is a response to the plurality of
moral and religious beliefs in our polyglot society in which there is
wide disagreement on what a good conscience should dictate.
Since no one moral system or religious set of beliefs is universally
accepted, society reasons that none can, or should be dominant.
All should be free to express themselves, and each should respect
the other. So goes the credo of political liberalism. On this view,
decisions that must be made as a matter of public policy in areas
such as abortion, euthanasia, and stem cell research, should be
made democratically, universally, and equally binding. Conscience
or exemption clauses presumably are devised to protect the free-
dom of the dissenter. Without dissecting its merits or demerits, this
liberal democratic policy has functioned to avoid civil strife. How-
ever, the recent erosion of the number of beliefs held in common,
and the increasingly varied demography of our nation, has magni-
fied the complexity and depth of our differences about what is
morally right and wrong. The secular solution of moral or value
neutrality has generated genuine conflicts of conscience.
Religious exemption laws and conscience clauses have appeared
as a device to protect the physician's conscience. Their inade-
45. See Frank Shakespeare, A View from Administration and Government, in
CATHOLIC CONSCIENCE FOUNDATION AND FORMATION, supra note 25, at 259-64 (dis-
cussing the evolution of our society into a secular state).
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quacy, however, is becoming manifest. Lawmakers have currently
drafted some of those clauses so narrowly that they disqualify most
religious institutions from exemption, especially if they are in-
volved in providing assistance and social services irrespective of the
religious persuasions of those they help.46 On these grounds, Cath-
olic institutions are simply not religious enough unless they help
the sick and needy for distinctly religious purposes. If they are to
be classified as "religious," Catholic institutions must serve only
Catholics.47 On the other hand, if they do so, they are disqualified
since they would then discriminate against, and take advantage of,
the vulnerable, sick, and poor.
Moreover, secular morality, which supposedly tolerates differ-
ences, does so only within a narrow range of so-called "values" that
are supposedly "free" of moral or religious taint. But secular mo-
rality is itself an orthodoxy. Its "values" are based in democratic
procedures, personal preference as the basis for moral choice, com-
mitment to a free market economy, the commodification of health
care, and an eschewal of religious belief.48 To deviate from this
notion of moral "neutrality" in public policy is to be "undemo-
cratic," prejudiced, and intolerably sectarian.
This is not the place to challenge these dicta of secularism as a
ruling orthodoxy, but to spell out in more detail their implications
for Catholic Christian physicians' freedom of conscience. Again,
the Catholic physician is the focus, but the same conflicts would
apply to any other religious or moral system with a clear and une-
quivocal set of precepts giving substance to the conscience of its
followers. The conflicts can be divided into three groups: first, be-
tween patients and physicians,49 second, between physicians and
society,5" and third, between Catholic institutions and society.5'
46. Myers, supra note 39, at 23-26; Msgr. Dennis Schnurr, Mandating Employer
Coverage of Contraceptives: Protecting Conscientious Objection, 30 ORIGINS 161, 163-
64 (2000).
47. Cath. Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 183
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001), petition for review granted, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 258 (Cal. 2001);
Religious Refusals and Reproductive Rights, REPROD. RTS. UPDATE, 2002, at 8, availa-
ble at http://www.aclu.org/issues/reproduct/refusal-report.pdf (last visited Sept. 24,
2002).
48. Pellegrino, Bioethics at Century's Turn, supra note 41, at 655, 663-64.
49. See infra Part IV.A.
50. See infra Part IV.B.
51. See infra Part IV.C.
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IV. CONFLICTS OF CONSCIENCE FOR CATHOLIC PHYSICIANS
A. Conflicts Between Patients and Physicians
Physicians and patients may differ sharply in what their con-
sciences tell them about the moral licitness of assisted suicide, eu-
thanasia, the dignity and worth of human life, the relative
importance of quality of life, age, or economics as criteria for with-
holding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatments, terminal seda-
tion, or whether death of the whole brain and partial brain death
are both equivalent to the death of the patient. The same is true of
cloning, stem cell research, and fetal tissues transplantation.
Some would argue that the principle of patient autonomy should
prevail in such conflicts, and that the physician, irrespective of her
own beliefs, should provide whatever secular social convention le-
gally allows.52 On this view, medicine is bound by a social contract
to provide the services patients or society deem worthwhile. This
obligation is in return for society permitting them to set its own
standards of education and practice. In addition, they would claim
that it is a failure of the principle of beneficence not to do what the
patient believes to be in her best interests. Still, others might re-
duce the argument to one of commutative justice, holding that the
patient is entitled to the same care available to other patients
whose doctors do not suffer from the Catholic doctor's scruples
against abortion, euthanasia, or other human life issues.
At present, Catholic physicians may withdraw from the care of
patients in these circumstances. However, one wonders how long
this exemption will survive, as end-of-life and reproductive deci-
sions become so much an individual prerogative that the ethical
standard is no longer a determination of what is morally right, but
rather, of what can be negotiated to resolve conflicts.53 One can
foresee the day when patients may gain legal rights to demand a
full range of death "services" from every licensed physician just as
many today feel entitled to a full range of reproductive "services."
Already we hear ethicists suggesting that physicians must sepa-
rate their personal moral beliefs from their professional lives if
they wish to practice in a secular society and remain licensed as
fully functioning physicians. 54 If universal health-care were to be
52. Cf May, supra note 39, at 111-12 (suggesting that there are certain situations
in which a health care professional could acknowledge her moral concerns with par-
ticular treatment choices).
53. Pellegrino, Bioethics at Century's Turn, supra note 41, at 656-57.
54. See Jeffrey Blustein & Alan R. Fleishman, The Pro-Life Maternal-Fetal
Medicine Physician: A Problem of Integrity, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1995,
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instituted and "death care," as well as birth and reproductive care,
were to be entitlements, would Catholic physicians be given only
limited practice licenses?
This same question could logically be raised, for example, with
respect to stem cell therapy. Using stem cells derived from the kill-
ing of human embryos is morally offensive to Catholic physicians.
If the therapeutic potentials of stem cell research, genetic engineer-
ing, and cloning are actualized, could a conscience clause protect
Catholic physicians in secular hospitals or in managed care organi-
zations? Would they not be legally required to provide a full range
of services despite moral objection? In an HMO would the com-
mercial gains of services patients demand trump a conscience
clause? Would religious physicians be hired in the first place?
B. Conflicts with Societal Mores
It has already been seriously suggested that Catholic physicians
should not become maternal child specialists, since they cannot, in
good conscience, provide the whole range of reproductive, preg-
nancy, and neonatal "services," such as, selective abortion for ge-
netic defects, or late-term abortion. The logical next step of such
proposals is to withhold specialty certification for maternal
medicine from Catholic physicians and others who oppose provi-
sion of any such services, which are legal. Should anyone who
wishes to be a physician be permitted to narrow the range of ser-
vices to her patients on the basis of moral and religious reserva-
tions? A medical education is a socially sanctioned process in
which students learn by doing.56 Some would argue that the physi-
cian's social contract requires her to provide what she has learned
in accord with whatever society needs because society granted the
privileges of a medical education in the first place.
These are not imaginary scenarios. Catholic and other relig-
iously committed applicants to medical school have been asked
about their views on the issues of abortion, euthanasia, ending life
support, various reproductive technologies, and stem cell re-
at 22-26 (discussing the dilemma faced by physicians who must perform abortions and
maintain their own integrity); Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody, Professional In-
tegrity and Physician-Assisted Death, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1995, at 8-17
(analyzing the relationship between professional integrity and physician-assisted
suicide).
55. See Blustein & Fleishman, supra note 54, at 25.
56. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Philosophy and Ethics of Medical Education, in 2 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS, 860, 863-69 (Warren T. Reich ed., 2d ed. 1978).
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search 7.5  Evidence that responses consistent with Catholic teach-
ing have militated against admission is hard to come by for obvious
legal reasons. Therefore, we do not know how heavily medical
schools weigh the "Catholic" responses against a candidate. The
fact that they asked the questions in the first place, is sufficient
cause for worry given the dominance of the secular viewpoint in
academic circles today.
Based on personal experience on admissions committees, there
is more than a mere suspicion that "conservative" Catholics, Or-
thodox Jews, and fundamentalist Christians may be looked upon
with disfavor. Much depends on the lottery of interviewers one
encounters by chance. Those who hold certain religious beliefs, it
is argued, cannot provide all the services patients have a right to
expect. Whether we shall ever come to the point at which religious
believers who insist on following their consciences will be barred
from certain specialties or from medicine itself is, therefore, a
source of more than imaginary concern.
C. Conflicts Between Catholic Institutions and Society
Organizational ethics is the newest addition to the broadening
spectrum of ethical issues being subsumed under the term
"bioethics. ' 'S 8 While it may include business ethics, it covers much
more, and already embraces such varied aspects of institutional be-
havior as relationships with employees, advertising, community
commitments, quality of care for the poor and uninsured, and
mergers with other institutions.
Organizational ethics is a systematic examination of the morality
of collective actions in human institutions dedicated to some spe-
cific purposes in society.59 The ethical "code" or commitment of a
specific institution is now customarily expressed in its mission
statement. This is in a way the "conscience" of the institution.6 °
All who work in that institution are in some way accountable for
adherence to the organizational mission, which is in effect a prom-
ise by the institution to behave in a particular way. Catholic insti-
tutions in America have for a long time had specific ethical
57. Id.
58. Susan Dorr Goold, Trust and the Ethics of Health Care Institutions, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 26, 27-28.
59. Id. at 32.
60. Id. at 28.
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directives that define them as Catholic hospitals.61 They are also
committed to a charitable, even preferential treatment for the sick
and the poor.62 Catholic hospitals can properly be considered to
have a definable institutional "conscience," one, which given the
content of the Catholic moral tradition, could and does come into
conflict with secular society and its "values. 63
The ethical content of the institutional conscience of particular
hospitals is well known with respect to sterilization, abortion, eu-
thanasia, assisted suicide, contraception, and cooperation through
mergers with other institutions that accept these practices. 64 Fidel-
ity to these prohibitions is not negotiable." It applies to all who
practice in these hospitals regardless of their personal beliefs.
Catholic hospitals, like Catholic physicians, do not have the option
of being "value-neutral" or of separating religious from profes-
sional ethical precepts.
There is growing evidence that public funding for Catholic health
care and social service institutions may be in jeopardy if these insti-
tutions do not provide the "full range" of reproductive services.
For example, the District of Colombia City Council recently passed
a bill mandating that all employers in the city had to provide cover-
age for contraceptives in their prescription coverage plans.66 The
move to include a conscience clause to exempt Catholic institutions
was rejected vitriolically by one member of the Council. 67 Fortu-
nately, the mayor, a Catholic himself, gave the bill a pocket veto.68
This sort of challenge to institutional conscience is certain to re-
turn in one way or another. Some who oppose Catholic moral
teaching vehemently and frankly admit to wanting to eliminate the
Catholic health care system and at the least deny access to public
funds.69 The more moderate alternative is to interpret exemption
clauses so narrowly that Catholic institutions cannot be classified as
"religious" institutions since they treat all regardless of belief and
provide much more than religious services.7 °
61. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL DIRECTIVES FOR CATHO-
LIC HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 9-11, 13-16, 18-22, 25-28, 30-33, 36-37 (4th ed. 2001),
available at http://www.nccbuscc.org/bishops/directives.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002).
62. Id. at 8-11.
63. Id. at 12-16, 23-33.
64. Id. at 8-16, 23-37.
65. Id.
66. Schnurr, supra note 46, at 161-63.
67. Myers, supra note 39, at 23-26; Schnurr, supra note 46, at 164.
68. Schnurr, supra note 46, at 161-63.
69. Myers, supra note 39, at 23-26.
70. Id.
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The challenge to institutional conscience promises to grow in se-
verity as new, morally questionable therapeutic procedures emerge
from the laboratories and research centers. There is a genuine
probability that stem cell research of the kind that depends on the
death of embryos, human cloning for therapeutic purposes, or cross
species genetic manipulation will eventually be allowed.71 Should
these measures become clinically effective, the public demand for
their availability will increase the pressure for conformity by all
hospitals regardless of religious affiliation.
Even if Catholic hospitals are allowed the protection of exemp-
tion clauses there is still the more subtle threat to the conscience,
stemming from cooperation with secular institutions through merg-
ers. These mergers may be dictated by the need for economic sur-
vival, but such survival cannot be bought at the cost of even
material cooperation of a direct kind with institutions that violate
the established ethical directives for Catholic health care institu-
tions. Already there is concern that mergers already in existence
may involve Catholic hospitals too closely with activities that are
morally objectionable.72 Can these Faustian bargains survive closer
moral scrutiny?
Catholic moral tradition contains a carefully nuanced set of con-
ditions under which cooperation with those individuals or institu-
tions that do not share Catholic moral beliefs may be licit.73
Considerable controversy has already arisen as to whether the in-
terpretation of these conditions in some mergers has been too lax.
This is the case even where the non-Catholic partner promises to
abide by the ethical directives of the Catholic bishops.74 Commin-
gling of funds, administrative entanglements, and other interm-
inglings characteristic of today's complex institutional relationships
raise serious questions of illicit cooperation in seemingly "safe"
mergers.7 5 Exemption and conscience clauses in these mergers or
in the relationships with public policy may not be sufficient to per-
mit financial viability for Catholic health care systems. Much de-
pends on how well Catholic institutions can maintain their moral
integrity and institutional conscience. Catholic health care institu-
tions constitute a very significant sector of service for Americans,
71. Id.
72. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 61, at 34-37.
73. See generally ORVILLE N. GRIESE, CATHOLIC IDENTITY IN HEALTH CARE:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 373-416 (1987).
74. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 61, at 34-37.
75. Id.
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Catholic and non-Catholic.76 If these institutions do not survive
financially, the loss to the general public will be great. If they sur-
vive only by a loss of their institutional Catholic conscience, some-
thing even more fundamental will be lost, not just for Catholics,
but for that sector of the American public who, for their own moral
integrity, cannot accept the dictates of a secular order.
V11. CONFLICTING MODELS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
How, in a morally pluralist society, can the moral claim to free-
dom of conscience owed to every person as a human being be sus-
tained? Specifically, how can the Catholic physician or institution
sustain freedom of conscience in a secular world whose culture is a-
religious, if not anti-religious? What role might conscience clauses
play? Several ways out of the dilemma have been suggested, none
of them entirely satisfactory. They include: dissociation of the
moral and professional life, abandonment of medicine as a profes-
sion, or maintaining moral integrity with judicious dissent.
It would be in keeping with secular orthodoxy to allow Catholic
physicians and hospitals freedom of conscience, but to limit its
overt exercise. Catholic physicians could have the right not to par-
ticipate in medicine as a profession as long as they would do what
is allowable by law (for example euthanasia in Oregon, abortion
everywhere, sterilization, etc.). The only thing Catholics would
need to do is to provide whatever services are defined by social
convention as legal medical practice. On this view, all physicians,
Catholic and others, whose moral beliefs are at odds with a secular
society simply need to take a "value free" stance. In this way, the
autonomy of the patient is preserved and the doctor does not "im-
pose" her beliefs.77 This is the strong version of value neutrality as
the litmus test for medical licensure or certification.
In a weaker version, Catholic physicians could be granted the
right to participate in medicine as a profession as long as they
would agree to what is allowable by law or defined as part of medi-
cal practice by the rest of the profession. Catholics, for example,
could object to euthanasia in Oregon, sterilization, abortion, repro-
ductive technologies, and stem cell research. They could refuse
76. See id. at 34-36 (discussing how Catholic Healthcare institutions are forging
partnerships and ventures with many other healthcare providers).
77. Blustein & Fleishman, supra note 54, at 22-26; Miller & Brody, supra note 54,
at 8-17; Edmund D. Pellegrino, Commentary: Value Neutrality, Moral Integrity, and
the Physician, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 78, 78-80 (2000) [hereinafter Pellegrino,
Commentary].
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personally to participate. But in practice they would have to be
"value neutral" if they entered specialities that required acts to
which they had moral objection.
At the very least, they would have to commit themselves to ar-
range for referral to a physician they know would do what the pa-
tient wished and assist the patient in every way to achieve her
purposes. On a stronger version of this form of accommodation,
Catholic physicians would be compelled to make a clear choice,
either fulfill the conditions of the social contract and provide what
is legal or socially acceptable or drop out of any specialty, which
required services of which they took moral exception.
In its strongest form this model would logically exclude from
medical practice, and eventually the study of medicine, all who did
not see their social roles as conforming to all the services society
felt necessary and required of physicians. Needless to say, such a
compromise as accommodation requires even in its mildest form
would be morally objectionable for several reasons.
It assumes that the Catholic physician and others who hold firm
moral beliefs can separate their professional and personal lives
when this means cooperation with what is morally objectionable.
For a physician with deep religious commitments, a "value free"
stance on certain issues is simply unthinkable.78 Certain matters
are so clearly prohibited as inherently wrong that there is no possi-
bility of compromise without compromise of moral integrity and
danger to one's spiritual well-being.
For Catholics, Orthodox Jews, and Moslems, the teachings of the
Gospel, Torah, or Koran take precedence in their lives and indeed
inspire their healing vocations. For these major religions, healing
the sick is ultimately a religious act and it comes ultimately from
God.79 To practice medicine that contravenes religious teaching
would be to subvert conscience to secular society and its "values,"
to act hypocritically, and to violate moral integrity intolerably.
For Catholics this would also apply to the secular demand that
those who must refrain from certain practice must refer physicians
who will provide the disputed treatment or procedure would also
be intolerable. To cooperate in an act which is regarded as inher-
ently morally wrong, such as arranging for an abortion or assisted
suicide, is to be a moral accomplice." Respectfully, courteously,
but definitively the religious physician must inform the patient of
78. Pellegrino, Commentary, supra note 77, at 78-80.
79. 38 Eccelsiasticus (Sirach) (Jerusalem Bible).
80. GRIESE, supra note 73, at 386-90.
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her objection while promising to care for the patient until transfer
or referral can be arranged by the patient, family, or social services.
Obviously the patient cannot be abandoned, legally or morally,
and must be cared for until a transfer has been effected. The doc-
trine of cooperation does not forbid transferring information, find-
ings, or records to another physician or hospital.8' Indeed, this is
required in the interests of patient care. What is illicit is active
cooperation in finding a physician who will provide the morally ob-
jectionable service.
The requirement of a secular society that physicians practice
"value neutrality," is impossible to achieve. First, it is a psychologi-
cal schism that violates the integrity of the person as a unity of
body, soul, and psyche. What it amounts to is the elevation of sec-
ularism to the level of a social orthodoxy; thereby, violating one of
the major tenets of secularism itself-that no ideology would have
preference over any other.82 It also violates a prized precept of the
secular, democratic, constitutional social order by discriminating
against a significant segment of the population, and the physicians
who share certain religious beliefs.
The difficulty of a meaningful compromise between the secular
orthodoxy and religious belief is illustrated in those pragmatic at-
tempts to find a way to respect moral integrity and the right of
conscientious objection. For example, Wicclair would allow for
conscientious objection as long as it corresponded to "one or more
core values of medicine. ' 83 He would use congruence with these
core values as the moral test for an acceptable claim to conscien-
tious objection.84
Wicclair offers a guide for assigning moral weight within recog-
nized medical norms. For example, he gives more weight to
preventing death than protecting confidentiality.85 He takes his
cue here from the integrity of the profession, rather than the integ-
rity of the physician as a moral person.86 In one of his examples, he
clearly states that more moral weight should be given to a physi-
cian's request to preserve moral integrity as a physician than to her
81. Id.
82. See also May, supra note 39, at 111 (discussing the conflict that arises when a
physician's values and conscience conflict with a patient's values and autonomy rights,
and noting that society increasingly and unfairly pressures physicians to disregard
their personal consciences in their professional roles).
83. Wicclair, supra note 3, at 217.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 223.
86. Id. at 224.
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"moral integrity as an Orthodox Jew who happens to be a
physician. "87
In his guidelines, Wicclair clearly makes religious belief sub-
servient to professional medical belief about what is right and
wrong.88 Its effect is to require the kind of value and belief dichot-
omy, which is incompatible with moral integrity for a true religious
person. The moral values of religious persons transcend the "val-
ues" of the profession-especially now that those values have
changed so drastically. Where there might have been concurrence
in the past between medically-held and religiously-held beliefs, that
congruence has been seriously eroded today.
Indeed, consensus on the moral values of medicine is being pro-
gressively reduced to competence, refraining from harm, and the
protection of confidentiality. The recent set of commitments ad-
vanced by the American Board of Internal Medicine, the Ameri-
can Society for Internal Medicine, and the European Federation
attempts to recover the idea of professionalization. 89 However, it
omits the prohibitions against abortion and euthanasia, the
precepts that are most significant for many religious physicians and
especially for Roman Catholics. The "moral integrity" of the pro-
fession is thus judged to be morally insufficient to justify overriding
the physician's conscience.
The moral authority of professional codes does not derive from
their acceptance by the profession or social convention.90 Rather,
the ethics of medicine is grounded in something more fundamental,
namely the ethical obligation peculiar to what it means to be ill, to
be healed, and to offer oneself as a healer.91
Respecting a physician's conscience claims, however, does not
mean that the physician is empowered to override the patient's
morally valid claim to self-determination. Both the physician and
the patient as human beings are entitled to respect for their per-
sonal autonomy. Neither one is empowered to override the other.
The protection of freedom of conscience is owed to both.
Therefore, patients have an uncontested moral right to informed
consent and informed refusal. 92 Wicclair and May spend consider-
87. Id. at 225.
88. Id.
89. Medical Professionalism in the New Millenium: A Physician Charter, 136 AN-
NALS INTERNAL MED. 243, 243-44 (2002).
90. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Professional Codes, in METHODS IN MEDICAL ETHICS
70, 74-76 (Jeremy Sugarman & Daniel Sulmasy eds., 2001).
91. Id. at 78-79.
92. Wicclair, supra note 3, at 208.
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able time defending the patient's moral right to refuse treatment,
prolong their life, request palliative care, or "reproductive free-
dom." This is not the issue here. Conscientious objection implies
the physician's right not to participate in what she thinks morally
wrong, even if the patient demands it. It does not presume the
right to impose her will or conception of the good on the patient.
Therefore, May is correct in stating that, "[r]ights of conscience
in health care must be exercised in the context of patients' rights to
informed consent. ' 93 This does not at all imply that we should or
must acknowledge limits on the physician's rights of conscience. 94
May agrees that patients do not have a right to demand "anything"
they take to be beneficial.9 Clearly the patient's moral and legal
right to self-determination has limits, even in May's view.
96
Both May and Wicclair, but especially May, spend much time on
examples of conflict in choice of treatment and somewhat miss the
point of religious objections, which is not whether a religious be-
liever may impose her beliefs on a patient, but rather whether she
has the moral right to refuse to be an accomplice in an act her
religion teaches is wrong.97
The only ethically viable course for the religious physician is to
maintain fidelity to moral integrity and the dictates of conscience
while practicing in a secular world. Catholic physicians and institu-
tions have the same moral claim to exercise of conscience, as all
other humans, even when the fruit of conscience is refusal and
even resistance to accommodation of secular beliefs or the chang-
ing beliefs of their professional colleagues. This moral claim entails
the right and obligation to use the methods available in a demo-
cratic society to protest morally objectionable practices by persua-
sion, judicious political action, and public debate, particularly in
the most egregious situations.
For such a position to be tenable, Catholic physicians must make
their positions publicly known, as in the case with the Directives
for Catholic Health Care Institutions. Individual physicians should
prepare a leaflet outlining what they can, and cannot, in good con-
93. May, supra note 39, at 127.
94. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Bioethics as an Interdisciplinary Enterprise: Where
Does Ethics Fit in the Mosaic of Disciplines?, in PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE AND
BIOETHICS: A TWENTY YEAR RETROSPECTIVE & CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1-23 (Ronald
A. Carson & Chester R. Burns eds., 1997).
95. May, supra note 39, at 127.
96. Id.
97. Id.; Wicclair, supra note 3, at 205-11.
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science do.98 Patients should know in advance of a crisis that what
they desire and believe to be morally acceptable may not be ac-
ceptable to the physicians they may be engaging.
Such advance knowledge will not be possible in emergencies or
remote areas where the choice of physicians is limited. Even under
these circumstances, the Catholic physician cannot violate her con-
science to provide a morally objectionable procedure or treatment.
Physicians must know their own belief system well enough to rec-
ognize where compromise is possible without loss of moral integ-
rity and where it is not. Parenthetically, the Catholic physician is
under serious obligation to know the content of her own faith, so
that she does not impose hardship on the patient when alternative
routes are morally permissible. Sadly, this is not always the case.
The dissenting physician must always treat her patient with re-
spect, avoid moralizing condemnations, and explain the reasons for
her moral objections. She must also be aware that every matter of
conscience is not of equal gravity. Choosing when to take a mor-
ally dissenting stand is crucial if one's exercise of conscience is to
be valid and respected.
The same prescriptions and proscriptions are applicable to the
institutional conscience of Catholic health care institutions. They
cannot compromise on fundamental Catholic moral teachings even
if resistance might lead to their extinction. Total extinction is not
likely, however, the withdrawal of public funds will probably re-
strict the number of persons in the community, Catholic or non-
Catholic, that can be served by institutions faithful to their relig-
ious commitments. Although morally illicit, Catholic hospitals may
also "cooperate" more fully with the secular mores.
Conscience clauses for physicians probably have a limited value,
although they ought to be sought whenever possible. The likeli-
hood, given the current societal mores, is that conscience clauses
will be denied or progressively applied so narrowly as to be self-
defeating. At the least they provide legal limits that in a demo-
cratic society should protect dissenting physicians and institutions
from the grosser forms of ostracism.
Catholic institutions will probably find greater difficulty ob-
taining exemption clauses, especially if they accept public funds or
purport to serve community needs. Survival may require forma-
tion of a Catholic health care system nationally. Mergers with non-
Catholic institutions, except those that share Catholic perspectives
98. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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on the human life issues, will raise an increasing number of ques-
tions about cooperation. Given the size, geographic extent, and re-
sources a Catholic health care system faithful to magisterial
teachings is not an impossibility. Much would be lost were a secu-
lar society's dissonances to require the dissolution or "ghettoiza-
tion" of Catholic health care.
All the societal and political forces of our day are converging on
an actualization of the secular state. As medical technology en-
dows humans with ever greater power over the reproduction, ge-
netic endowment, and dying of our species, crises of conscience will
surely increase for those who hold religious beliefs about human
life, its creation, and ending. In democratic societies, there is a
commitment to protection of the right to hold and exercise individ-
ual and institutional conscience.
Conscience clauses are straws in the wind telling all of us that
public policy and individual conscience on some of the most impor-
tant matters of human life may be on a collision course. How indi-
vidual physicians and institutions preserve their moral integrity in
such a socio-political milieu is a matter of significance for both sec-
ularists and believers.
Conscience clauses will help at least to establish a right to dis-
sent. However, the conditions under which they will be applicable
and their effectiveness are very much at issue. It will be a stringent
test both of democracy and religious beliefs to see how these con-
flicts will be resolved.
